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MORE JUDGESHIPS -BUT

NOT ALL AT ONCE*

ABNER J. MIKVA**

I like to think that my time as a member of the United States House
of Representatives equips me to understand the legislative perspective
on issues that concern the administration of justice. In addition, I hope
that the current members of both Houses of Congress will not accuse me
of treason-or, what may be worse, call me a Pollyanna- when I suggest
that they cede some of their power to the judicial branch. In this article,
I want to add my voice to the growing chorus calling for a new method
for creating federal judgeships to meet changing needs. While I do not
wish to present a detailed proposal here-for that indeed would appear
to trench on the power of the legislature -I do want to express my conviction that the judicial branch, through the Judicial Conference of the
United States,1 ought to have more direct control over the processby
which judgeships are created. The details can be worked out with no
great difficulty, especially if the task is approached in a spirit of collegiality. Legislators and judges are, after all, not competitors but colleagues in the enterprise of the federal government.
Everyone knows by now that the caseload in the federal courts is too
high. Por a number of reasons-including increased litigation because of
recent federal legislation,2 a greater public awareness of legal rights and
wrongs,3 and more complex types of cases 4-the number of new filings
* This article is an expanded version of remarks delivered at the Brookings Institution
Seminar on the Administration of Justice, held at Williamsburg, Virginia on March 6-8,
1981.
** United States Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia Circuit. The author attended the University of Wisconsin, 1943-44, 1946-47, Washington University, 1947-48, and
received his law degree from the University of Chicago in 1951. He served as a member of
the United States House of Representatives for the Second and Tenth Districts of Illinois
for the periods 1968-72 and 1974-79 respectively.
See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1976).
2 See Kaufman, JudicialReform in the Next Century, 29 STAN. L. Rav. 1, 5-6 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Kaufman] (legislators fail to consider impact of laws on courts); Lasker,
The Court Crunch:A View From the Bench, 76 F.R.D. 245, 247-49 (1978) (analyzing effect of
recent legislation). See also note 9 infra.
' See Marcus, JudicialOverload:-The Reasons and the Remedies, 28 BUFFALO L. REv.
111, 122-24 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Marcus] (public awareness of legal remedies coincides
with growth of legal services).
See Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 96, 108-10 (1976)
(tax, patent, antitrust, and securities cases, among others, becoming too complex for trial
judges). Several commentators have recommended creation of specialized courts because of
the complexities involved in litigation in those areas. See H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURiSDICTION: A GENERAL VIEw 154-61 (1973) [hereinafter cited as FRIENDLY] (recommending creation

of Patent Court); Kaufman, supra note 2, at 18 (recommending creation of Court of Tax Ap-
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and the backlog of pending cases has grown at a rate that seems (fortuitously, I hope) to approach the rate of inflation of the currency.' We
may not be quite at the end of our rope, as Chief Judge Brown suggested
for the Fifth Circuit a few years ago,6 but we are not exactly sitting pretty
either. The substantial increase in the number of federal judgeships provided in the Omnibus Judgeship Act of 19787 was, of course, very
helpful.' But, as I hope to show, the Omnibus Bill was a classic example
of aid arriving too late-and in too great a quantity at once.
There are a number of ways to deal with the caseload problem. Some
are, as far as I can tell, completely noncontroversial. No one would
dispute, for example, that we all should strive for administrative efficiency by eliminating wasteful uses of the resources we have. When we
attempt to rise above the level of the platitudinous, however, we encounter more complex issues.
I believe that solutions for judicial logjams can most usefully be placed
into two categories. The solutions involve either an engineered decrease
in the flow of business to the courts, or an increase in the resources
available to meet the flow. These two measures for dealing with judicial
overload can, of course, exist in conjunction. As far as the first category
is concerned, I am sure that more use can be made of methods to reduce
the workload of the courts by diverting some disputes into other channels.9 If both parties to a dispute that traditionally would involve a
lawsuit can be satisfied by means of a simpler, cheaper, and faster
resolution process, then we should all be grateful. Significant progress
can perhaps be achieved by reducing the types of cases that may be
heard in first instance federal courts"0 or appealed from agency fora to
peals); Whitney, The Case For Creating a Special Environmental Court System, 14 Wm. &
MARY L. REV. 473 (1973).
' The number of appellate filings grew 126.4% between 1969 and 1980. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 43,
Table 1.
' Omnibus Judgeship Bilk Hearings on S.11, S.460, and PrintedAmendment to S.11
Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 595 (1977). See also
Wright, The OverloadedFifth Circuit-A Crisisin JudicialAdministration,42 TEx. L. REV.
949, 949 (1964).
' Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 28 U.S.C. (Supp.
IV 1980)) [hereinafter cited as Omnibus Act].
8 Congress provided for 117 district judgeships and 35 circuit judgeships in the Omnibus Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 44, 133 (Supp. IV 1980).
' See, e.g., Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231,
237-38 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Bork] (suggesting increased use of administrative law
judges to handle repetitious cases arising under recent legislation); note 4 supra (specialized
courts). See generally Marcus, supra note 3, at 133-37; Friendly, Averting the Flood By
Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 634 (1974); Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the
Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the NationalLaw, 82 HARv.
L. REV. 542 (1969).
" A number of authorities have suggested the abolition of federal diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., FRIENDLY, supra note 4, at 139-52; Burger, The State of The Federal
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federal appellate courts.11 In addition, there certainly are some cases
that can be dealt with summarily without a loss of fairness to the parties: reduction in oral argument and-the use of brief memorandum opinions are tools that readily come to mind.12
Nevertheless, I suggest that one can easily get carried away with
these attempts to decrease the workload of the courts. Bear in mind that
I am talking here about employing measures such as withdrawal of
federal jurisdiction only in terms of the goal of increased efficiency. I am
not discussing the other, much more significant and controversial goals
of these proposals, such as an alteration in the balance of power among
the three branches of the government. Viewed from the more limited
perspective of judicial efficiency, suggestions for taking business away
from the courts may well entail costs that far outweigh their benefits."3
No one would suggest that we solve the problem of high air fares by
moving our cities closer together. Likewise, we should not be too eager
to relieve the courts if their relief entails merely a shift of the burden to
some other governmental entity or, what is worse, a net loss in the quality of justice rendered to the citizenry. The system of justice with the
lowest budget would be the one that entertained no lawsuits at all, but
that system ultimately would impose the greatest cost on the society as
a whole.
The other type of solution, an increase in judicial resources, has the
virtue of simplicity, at least when viewed in terms of the end result: if4
there are more judges, then presumably the work will get done faster.1
As a matter of social policy it should not be too difficult to decide
whether that benefit is worth the easily calculable costs of salaries, support services, and so on. It should come as no surprise, then, that increasing the numbers of federal judges has, in Senator DeConcini's
words, been the "conventional" solution to the problem. 5 Not that there
is no upper limit to the numbers of judges we can have while maintainJudiciary-1979,65 A.B.A. J. 358, 362 (1979); Clark, A Commentary on Congestion in the
Federal Courts, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 407,408 (1976). See generally Bratton, Diversity Jurisdiction-An Idea Whose Time Has Passed,51 IND. L.J. 347 (1976).
" See generally Currie & Goodman, JudicialReview of FederalAdministrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1975); Marcus, supra note 3, at
118.
" See generally Merrill, Could Judges Deliver More Justice If They Wrote Fewer
Opinions?, 64 JUDICATURE 435 (1981). But see Bork, supra note 9, at 233 (intuitive wisdom of
law requires written opinions). See also Benjamin & Morris, The Appellate Settlement Conference: A Procedure Whose Time Has Come, 62 A.B.A. J. 1433 (1976).
" See generally Rosenberg, Planned Flexibility to Meet Changing Needs of the
FederalAppellate System, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 576 (1974).
14 This is not to say that doubling the number of judges, for example, would cut
backlogs in half. One possible effect of increasing the number of judges is that some careful
judges will begin to take more time with their opinions.
DeConcini, New Perspectivesfor JudicialImprovements: A CongressionalView, 24
N.Y.L.SCH. L. REv. 323, 324 (1978).
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ing certain other desiderata such as collegiality and consistency of precedent. l" There do seem, however, to be reasonable solutions to the potential problems that would be experienced-by courts that are too large. A
good example is the provision in the 1978 Omnibus Act allowing courts
of appeals to perform their en banc function with fewer than the total
number of active sitting judges, if that number exceeds fifteen."
Should I stop here, then, or perhaps end merely with a reiteration
that we would be grateful if Congress would graciously provide us with
some more federal judgeships? I am afraid not. Once we accept that an
increase in the number of judgeships generally is a good thing, we must
confront the problem on which I want to concentrate in this piece: how,
given the desirability of the end result-more judgeships as they are
needed -do we structure the means?
Not only in 1978 but in the past as well, the usual method for
creating new federal judgeships has been the omnibus bill, dealing with
all the perceived needs of the entire judicial system at once.18 The basic
difficulty with these bills is that they have delivered what was needed
too late, and, paradoxical as it may sound, they have delivered too much
of it at once.
The bills have come too late because they have been so few and far
between. The latest one, for example, came after eight years had
elapsed.19 While it provided for a record number of new judgeships," it
responded to a need that had been growing steadily since 1970. By the
time the bill was enacted, the judicial system was in a crisis and some
courts were near collapse. 1 The mere enactment of the legislation did
not, of course, immediately install any new judges in the courtrooms.
The new positions had to be filled by presidential nomination and
senatorial confirmation.' The process took considerably longer than it
had in the past (indeed, it may be said to be still going on, because not all
the vacancies have been filled), chiefly because of President Carter's
decision to introduce merit selection of appellate judges by the use of
nominating commissions.' Even as the new judges began to assume
"ISee

supra note 4, at 29-30; Marcus, supra note 3, at 32-33. Justice
Frankfurter once wrote that "a powerful judiciary implies a relatively small number of
judges." Frankfurter, Distribution of JudicialPower Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.J. 499, 515 (1928).
'7 Omnibus Act § 6, 28 U.S.C. § 41 (Supp. IV 1980).
" C. BAAR, JUDGESHIP CREATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: OPTIONS FOR REFORM 29,
Table 1 (Federal Judicial Center 1981) [hereinafter cited as BAAR].
9 See id.
" See note 8 supra. The Omnibus Act increased the number of district judgeships by
30% and circuit judgeships by 36%. See BAAR, supra note 18, at 4.
21 See note 6 supra.
See H. CHASE, FEDERAL JUDGES: THE APPOINTING PROCESS 4 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as CHASE].
' See generally L. BERKSON & S. CARBON, THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE
NOMINATING COMMISSION: THE MEMBERS, PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES (1980); Berkson,
Carter's Judicial Selection. How Well Does It Work?, 19 JUDGE'S J., Fall 1980, at 4.
FRIENDLY,
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their duties, it became clear that ever-increasing caseloads necessitated
the creation of still more judgeships. 2 The omnibus bills are by their
nature an attempt at catching up with a dire need. We have not caught
up with the need for more judgeships yet, for it is exacerbated year by
year.
When the new judgeships were created in 1978, they came too fast
for all three branches of government to handle efficiently. First, it was a
much more complex task to agree on an omnibus bill than to deal with
needs that had arisen over a shorter period. There was much wrangling
over which areas were to receive how many judgeships, and this consumed
a great deal of the legislators' time. Once the bill had passed, the executive branch- particularly during the Carter presidency-had to

scramble to find enough qualified candidates for the vacancies. This process placed a particularly heavy burden on the-Justice Department, with
its responsibilities for investigating candidates.' It seems clear that a
better job could be performed if one had far fewer slots to worry about
at one time. After the qualified candidates had been identified, the Senate
Judiciary Committee had to deal with the nominations, as did the entire
body after the Committee had carried out its task. Last but not least, the
judicial branch had to face the often mundane but not inconsiderable
tasks involved in dealing with large numbers of neophyte judges. The
judges had to be trained' and staffs and quarters had to be found." A
tremendous strain was placed on the judicial system. While it is impossible to say with any certainty what substantive effect the advent of so
many newcomers at one time will have on the development of the law, it
seems obvious that the orderly progress of the law would be better served by more gradual infusions of new blood.
You would not choose a physician who refused to treat you for eight
years while your malady worsened, and who then offered you a dose of
medicine purportedly large enough to cure you immediately and prevent
future recurrences of the disease. You would rightly fear the side effects
" See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
September 24-25, 1980, at 65-67. The Judicial Conference recommended to the 97th Congress that it create an additional 11 permanent and 3 temporary circuit judgeships, 23 permanent and 6 temporary district judgeships, and convert 1 currently temporary district
judgeship to a permanent position. Id.
' See CHASE, supra note 22, at 17-18. Within the Justice Department, the Deputy Attorney General has come to be the official with primary responsibility for judicial appointments. See id.
I Most judges come to the bench without judicial or administrative training. See
Clark, The FederalJudicial Center,53 JUDICATURE 99, 100 (1969). Orientation programs for
judges have become increasingly popular. Kaufman, supra note 2, at 17; see, e.g., Federal
Judicial Center, Proceedings of Seminar for Newly Appointed United States District

Judges, 75 F.R.D. 89 (1976).
" See generally Alpert, Atkins & Ziller, Becoming A Judge: The TransitionFromAdvocate to Arbiter,62 JUDICATURE 325, 325-32 (1979); Cook, The Socializationof New Federal
Judges: Impact on District Court Business, 1971 WASH. U. L.Q. 253 (1971).
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of such treatment and would have good reason to suspect that the cure
was as bad as the disease. So it is with the use of omnibus bills to treat
the ailing judicial system. One is led to wonder why this unhealthy state
of affairs has come about.
A discussion of why a given omnibus bill takes precisely so long to
pass could by itself become quite complicated. There are a number of
forces at work within the legislature when new judgeships are created,
and their interplay is subtle. But for our purposes a simple answer can
be given: old-fashioned politics. Federal judgeships are political plums.
Congressmen desire them in their districts and, as long as senatorial
courtesy prevails, senators quite naturally desire to have a say about
which candidate will fill a vacancy in their states. It takes time to determine what alterations should be made in all the federal courts across the
country, and the process is delayed even more by two acknowledged
facts. First, Congress will not create large numbers of judgeships in a
presidential election year.28 Second, if a House of Congress does not have
a majority of the President's party, it will be reluctant to create new
judgeships at all.' So the years drag on until, finally, the body politic no
longer can go without treatment. Then it gets what it needs-too late,
and too much at once.
What is to be done? I believe, as does the Chief Justice," that at
least some of the power to create federal judgeships should be delegated
to the judicial branch so as to ensure a more timely response to the
perceived need for increases (or, for that matter, decreases) in the
number of judges. It is not my purpose to present a detailed proposal for
implementing such a delegation. That is for Congress to do, and it
seems to me that the proper role for the judiciary in these matters is to
speak with one voice through the Judicial Conference.
I should like, however, to refer readers to a study that focused my
thinking on this subject. Professor Baar's study for the Federal Judicial
Center, "Judgeship Creation in the Federal Courts: Options for Reform,"'" offers an excellent starting point for further discussion within
the judicial branch and between judges and those who serve in the other
two branches. In his study, Professor Baar reviews various state provi' See Cannon & Cikins, Interbranch Cooperationin Improving the Administrationof
Justice: A MajorInnovation, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1, 5 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Cannon & Cikins].
"See, e.g., Crisis in Courts-New Moves to Speed Up Justice, U.S. News & World
Report, July 18, 1977, at 66-67 (Democrats more inclined to add judgeships since Democrat
became President); Discontent on the Bench, 222 NATION 229 (1976) (Democrats who control
Congress unwilling to give Republican President opportunity to appoint judges). See
generally BAAR, supra note 18, at 1-2.
Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary-1980, 66 A.B.A. J. 295, 297
(1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Report]. See also Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need
ForSystemic Anticipation, 49 N.Y. ST. B. J. 6, 48 (1977) (noting that in Florida the governor
can create new judgeships).
"1 BAAR, supra note 18.
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sions under which some portion of the authority for judgeship creation is
delegated to the judiciary, 2 and then considers how such a delegation
might be structured in the federal system. He recommends allowing the
Judicial Conference of the United States'3 to create a small number of
judgeships annually.34 Professor Baar would require that body to develop
explicit and public procedures, and an appropriate timetable, for exercising this authority. 5 In addition, he recommends that the delegation of
authority for judgeship creation should be subject to-external congressional checks. 6
It seems to me that some combination of features such as those suggested by Professor Baar could be created to satisfy just about everyone. There are indeed many options short of a complete-and, of course,
highly unlikely- turnover of legislative power to the judiciary. For example, carefully refined criteria for determining the need for additional
judgeships can be worked out. Temporary judgeships can be employed
to .achieve flexibility and to preserve ultimate congressional control over
the size of the judiciary. Other provisions can be made for congressional
oversight of judicial determinations of manpower need.
Again, I do not wish to pick and choose among the many possibilities
for giving the judiciary a greater role in judgeship creation. My main
purpose at this point is to foster enough confidence in the idea that the
thing can be done at all so that people will take the next step and begin
to determine how the details should fall into place. Perhaps I can contribute something by speaking as a former congressman to my erstwhile
colleagues on Capitol Hill. I understand,why legislators might balk at
any suggestions that they delegate some of the power they have held for
so long. Indeed, one would wish to beware at the outset of the
undesirable effects that could ensue if too great a delegation were to

Id. at 7-14. Nine states use statutory formulas or delegate authority to the judiciary
to determine the number of judgeships. Id. at 8-12. Professor Baar believes that the-success
of these judgeship creation methods is directly linked to the conservative use of the formula
or authority and the development of cooperative working relations with the state
legislatures. Id. at 12.
. Id. at 16-19. Professor Baar does not believe that the authority for judgeship creation should be given to the Supreme Court. Id. at 17. He discusses the relative advantages
and disadvantages of placing authority for district judgeship creation with the judicial councils of each circuit, with appellate judgeship creation authority residing in the Judicial Conference. Id. at 17-19.
Id. at 22-33. Professor Baar examines three methods of judgeship creation that
would limit the Judicial Conference's authority: (1)a formula; (2) a maximum number; and (3)
the creation of temporary judgeships only. Id. He recommends the "maximum number"
method, which would .provide the Judicial Conference with a quota. of judgeships to be
allocated at the point and time of need. Id. at 30. Professor Baar suggests that the fixed
maximum number would need to be responsive to any decreases in federal court workload.
Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 19-22.
Id. at 33-39.
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take place. I shudder to think, for instance, of courts intentionally
building up backlogs so they can earn new judgeships in competition
with other courts. Whether courts would behave in this fashion is
debatable, but a congressional fear in this respect is at least understahdable. I do think, though, that two possible objections can be dispelled in
order to pave the way for future discussions, and I should like to close by
mentioning them.
When Chief Justice Burger suggested in his State of the Judiciary
message in 1980 that the judiciary might usefully be given greater
authority over the creation of judgeships, 7 one legislator is reported to
have reacted with incredulity. Senator DeConcini, then the Chairman of
the Senate Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, said
of the Chief Justice's suggestion, "Surely he doesn't really propose this
in a serious vein. It would take constitutional changes and would be
abrogating Congress' responsibilities."3 8 I would comment only that in
light of the many delegations of power approved by Congress over the
last century, I am in turn somewhat incredulous. As Professor Baar
shows, 9 there are numerous workable and constitutionally unobjectionable means for ensuring that Congress retains an oversight role.
The other possible objection to the delegation of judgeship creation
power to the judiciary is a more practical one. Congress may be thought
unwilling to renounce a power that contains an element of patronage or
partisan advantage. I would respond by suggesting that this point be
kept in proper perspective for, if we do so, it dwindles to insignificance.
First, there are not that many judgeships to begin with, and obtaining
one for one's district is not that impressive compared with, for example,
an Air Force base or a hydroelectric plant. It should not be forgotten
that when Congress gives the judiciary the power to say how many
judgeships should be created and where, it is not handing over the
political benefit involved in the power to designate who fills these
judgeships.' Second, if Congress has been willing in the past to engage
in a massive renunciation of partisan political advantage for the good of
the country, as it did with the original Civil Service Act,"1 then it should
be able to swallow the sacrifice under discussion with ease. Finally, it
should be readily apparent that the benefits of enabling the judiciary to
respond in a more timely fashion to its changing manpower needs must
I

See 1980 Report, supra note 30, at 297.
BurgerProposes That a JudicialPane Not Congress, Create U.S. Judgeships, New
York Times, Feb. 4, 1980, at A12, col. 3.
" BAAR, supra note 18, at 33-39.
0 I address some of the qualities that ought to be considered in selecting judges in a

forthcoming issue of the

ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL

SCIENCE, scheduled for publication in July, 1982.
1 Civil Service Act of 1883, 22 Stat. 403, ch. 27 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18 &
40 U.S.C. (1976)).
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outweigh any costs involved. I for one am hopeful that this perception
will prevail in the Congress before too long. And the spirit of interbranch cooperation that has been manifesting itself in these Williamsburg conferences
over the past few years must be regarded as a hopeful
2
sign.1

z For a discussion of the Williamsburg seminars, see generally Cannon & Cikins,
supra note. 28.

